Review of Judicial Independence and Democracy in Pakistan

Abstract

Judicial independence is the backbone of constitutional democracy because it ensures that judges can decide cases without fear, pressure, or political bargaining. In Pakistan, however, this idea has developed in a turbulent constitutional environment shaped by repeated military takeovers, unstable civilian rule, and frequent constitutional disruption. This research examines how Pakistan’s superior judiciary has alternated between complicity and resistance, and how that pattern has affected democratic governance and the rule of law. Using a doctrinal and contextual method, the study traces the historical roots of judicial compromise beginning with Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan (PLD 1955 FC 240), where the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was upheld on technical grounds, an early turning point that later nourished the Doctrine of Necessity. The research shows that necessity jurisprudence gradually became a recurring legal cover for extra-constitutional governance, especially during the regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf. In these periods, Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCOs), enforced oaths, and “validation judgments” reshaped courts from constitutional guardians into crisis managers. This study also highlights that threats to judicial independence are not only external. Internal controversies relating to accountability, politicized appointments, seniority disputes, and administrative influence have weakened institutional cohesion and public trust. Further, the research finds that democratic governments have often repeated executive interference through appointment manipulation, political pressure, and resistance to adverse rulings, proving that democratic legitimacy alone does not guarantee constitutional restraint. Finally, the study evaluates contemporary developments, including the Twenty-seventh Constitutional Amendment (2025) and debates around restructuring constitutional adjudication. It concludes that judicial independence is not merely a legal safeguard but a democratic necessity: where courts compromise, constitutional limits collapse. The research recommends transparent appointments, respect for seniority, institutional autonomy, and clear limits on executive interference to rebuild constitutionalism and democratic resilience in Pakistan.